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In the coIJ1I\'IlUlique issued following the Summit meeting in Paris on
9/10  December 1974, the Cor;Ju'1:lA:;.'li-;;y  Institutions (the Council 'and Commission)
were invited "to set ';,;.:;.J as SOO~as possible a correcting mechanism of a
general applicatio~'1 \'ih:i.ch , in J,;he fraJ:eTrlOrk of the system of ' ownresouI"oes
and in harmony with its normal functioning, based on objective criteria and
taking into consideration in particular the suggestions Inade to this effeo~-
by the British Gover"11Illent , could prevent during the period of convergence of
the economies of the fJIember States the :i;)ossible development of situations
unacceptable for a Member State and incompatible with the smooth working of
the Community".
The Heads of Goverrnnent confirmed that "the system of ' own resources
represel1ts one of the fundamental elements of the economic integration of the
Community , and recalled the Community declaration during the aooession negot-
iations that "if unacceptable situations were to arise the very life of the
Community would make it imperative for the Institutions to find e~itable
solutions
" .
The Commission here sets out , in the light of these teA-ts,. the approach
it feels should be adopted in devising a correcting mechanism to prevent the
possible development of "~unacceptable situations incompatible with the smooth
working of the CommunityrIRAT CONSTITUTES AN "UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION INCOMPATIBLE rIITH THE
SMOOTH \-/ORKING OF TfIE CONI,ruNI'l'Y"
Paragraph
on which the
the possible
37 of the Paris Communique refers to objective criteria
correcting mechanism must be based and which must define
development of unacceptable situa-I;ions.
The Commission has endeavoured to define criteria straight-foI"Ward
enough for their fulfilment to be established without unnecessary
discussion,- and carrying sufficient meaning to enable an assessment to be made
of the risk of an unacceptable situation arising. These criteria would
be used as the basis for a decision to put the correcting mechanism
into operation.
For it to be apparent that an unacceptable situation is about to
arise, there have to be two factors present, the existence of which' 
itself. established, as a resultant of several criteria. These two
factors are a certain economic situation and a dispZ"oportionl;l.te contribution
to Community financing.
The Commission considers that the risk of an unacceptable situation
within the meaning of the Paris Communique m1J.st depend on an assessment
Qf the simultaneous occurrence for a Member State of a certain economic
3ituation and of a disproportionate contribution to Community financing.
Economic \3;i tuation
The criteria in, which may be adopted in this regard are of several kinds.
They may be indicators of national wealth', such asGZ"oss National
Product per capita, or of economic growth, such as the rate of increase in
GNP per capita. These criteria may be evaluated against a Community
average~ The former shows the extent of the current gap between nation?-l
economies and the latter gives a good idea of the convergence or divergence
between the )).1ember States' respective economic situations and of the
effectiveness of their economic policies.... .3 ...
Other criteria give a clearer picture of the overall state of
the economy concerned? for example the existenoeof a current-account
'1'$
balance-of-payments deficit, the size of which must be related------
to the Gro.ss National Produot.
These criteria have to be applied in combination to assess th~ economic
situation with regard to 'the question atissuej the definition of such
an econoraic situation is that the following are all present at the
same time:
Gross National Product per capita below 85% of the
Community average;
- rate of growth of GNP per capita below 120% Communi ty average; 1
- a deficit on the balance of payments on current a.Qoount.
These criteria vlould be calculated on the basis of a moving
three-year average, in line with the market rates of exchange, pending
the introduction of a theoretically more satisfactory system of
assessing rates of exchange in terms of pUI"ohasing power.
J .
l~fuere the national vlealth of a Member State measured by GNP per
capita is below the Community average, for the respective economic
situations to converge it is necessary that that State s rate of
growth should be above the Community average: this would result in
its progressively catching up with the others.' Where its rate of growth is
below the Community average it would only.lag further and fuI"ther
" behind them.- 4-
Disproportionate contribution to COIIUIItU'lity, f;i.nancw
As concerns OoIlllIl\Ulity financing, the Commission :t:eels s~veral
aspects of the Member States' payments towards theCoIIUIItU'lity fudget
have to be taken into consideration, both as to the criteria. defining
. the circumstances liable to lead to an unacceptable situation and, w:hen
t:hese criteria are fulfilled, as to t:he activation of the correoting
mechanism.
The first aspect, until Such time as the pZ"oeess of convergence has
been completed, could be comparison between a MembeZ" State s relative
shareoalculated aocord:i.ng to the results of the Deoision of 21 April 1970
on the replacement of financial oontri butions from the M~mber States by the
Communities ' own resources and what its share would be if based on the
straight relation between its own GNP and the CoIlllIl\Ulity
rIhere the 1JIember State s relative share is appreoia,bly higher than 
would be if based on relative GNP, and where the other criteria referred to
in this communication are opeZ"ative, corrective action would be called for.
Such action would need to tak~ account of the different character of the
three classes of Own Resources designated in the Deoision of 21 April 1970.
rIhereas payments from VAT (or based on relative GNP pending agreement on
VAT) can be regarded as a burden on the Member State concerned, the same
reasoning cannot be applied to the same extent to agricultural levies and 
customs duties , in conse~ence of the free movement of goods within the
Community. Hence, having regard to the nature and 'purposes of the Own Resouroes
system , the correcting mechanism4should not be set in motion every time that  axr:r
disparity, no matter how small , develops, and :E:or the same reason pven where it
is set in motion , the disparity should not be compensated in its entirety.
Accordingly, it would appear best that application of the correcting
mBohanism should be confined to cases where the relative share is over 110%
of the relative GNP of the Member State concerned; also, the correction should
not apply to the whole of the disparity but should be limited to two-thirds of it.
/ .
is Decision defines the relative share of, a Member State as the share of
each ~JIember State in the total amounts paid.5 -
The second aspect to be considered is the existence of a pot.ential net
foreign-exchange burden due to the implementation of the Community Budget.
So long as theprooess of convergence has not produced a true monetary union,
palfIllents towards the Community Budget represent a potential foreign-
exchange burden on the Member States. The Commun~ty Budget is implemented
through convertible aocountsheld by the Commission inEaoh Member State
Under the regulations in force, to avoid unnecessa~ exchange transactions, 
the Commission, to whose account are credited Member States' Own Resouroes
payments, gives priority in drawing on this' account  topa;yments corresponding
to its expenditures in the Member States concerned. In accordance with its
requirements, the Community may then make transfers for the purpose of financing
operations outside that State. As a result there is a potential net foreign-
exchange burden on the Member States concerned, once its national currency
has been paid outside its borders and can be the subject of conversion.
Unless there is such a potential foreign-exchange burden, Member States should
not be able to call in question the consequences of the Own Resources system.
Also, the amount of the potential net foreign-exchange burden would be
a second ceiling on the operation of the correcting mechanism. 
Thirdly J the correcting mechanism should take account of the different
nature of the three classes of Own Resources designated in the Decision of
21 April 1970: whereas payments fI"om VAT (or those based on relative GNP
pending agreement on VAT) can be regarded as a burden on the Member States
concerned, the same reasoning cannot be applied to the same extent to
agricultural levies and customs duties, because of the free movement of goods
wi thin the Community. Henoe operation of the correcting mechanism could
a.ppropriately be limited to the total payments in respect of VAT by the
Member State concerned.The foregoing comparisons and calculations would need to be effected
on the basis of market rates of exchange pending the introduction of a
theoretically more satisfactory system ofevalua.t:i.ng rates of exchange in
terms of purchasing power.
Procedure
The Commission oonsideZ"s that where the criteria for the possible development
of an una~ceptable si tuationare operative this entitles a Member' State
to apply for the correcting mechanism to be put into operation. It would
be for the 'Commission to assess the reality of the situation  reference
to the pre-established criteria, and if appropriate to enter the neoesSat'Y
amo'IIDt, determined as below, in the next preliminary draft Budget. The
Council would decid~ on the amo'IIDt so entered under the Budgeii prooedure.
In practice the Member state concerned would have to act at the end
of the first half-yeaZ". In doing so, it would indicate to what extent it
considered the above criteria applied to its case in the context of the
process of convergence of the Comm'IIDity economies. The criteria as to the
economic situation would be considered inl' the light of the figures for
the past ol;hree years expressed as a moving three-year average, and the criteria
as to contribution tp Community financing in the light of the forecasts for
the current year. The amo'IIDt required would be entered as "expenditure
necessarily resulting" in the Budget for the following year; it might if
necessary be adjusted on the basis of the correcting mechanism according to
the outturn of the forecasts of the contribution to Community financing.7 -
II. SUGGESTED CORRECTING MECHA1ITSM
To achieve the desired end, the Commission considers the correcting
mechanism to be used should be based on Budget refunding.
For this purpose, any excess pa;yment of Own Resources, On the basis of
Own Resources actually transferred and Own Resouroes which have been
transferred had a GNP-based financing scale been used, would give entitlement
to a refund from a new Budget line, the amount of the refund being determined
by reference to the excess payment.
For this purpose the amount would be calculated as follows:
(1) with respect to the tranche of the relative share between 100% and
105% of the relative GNP, there "lould be no refund;
with respect to the tranche of the relative share betw.een 105% and
110% of the relative GNP, the refund would be 50% of the payment
corresponding to this tranche~
(ii)
Similarly, for the tranches beyond, the refund would be:
11  0"/0-115%
11510-120%
120"/0-125%
12510-130%
130% and oVer
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%III.
- 8 -
As noted above, the amount of the refund would be subject
to a ceiling of (i) two-thirds of the total excess payment,
(ii) theamo'\Jl1.t of the net potential foreign-exohange burden
which the implementation of the Communi ty Budget imposed on the
Member State concerned or (iii) the amount of VAT Own Resouroes
paid, whichever was the lowest. Notwithstanding the Budget rules
in force, all the foregoing calculations are at market exchange
Z"ates; Bu.(lget entry would be calculated at the Bu.(lget , exchange rate.
exchange rate.
The fact that a lIJIember State has benefitted from the oorreoting
mechanism . for three consecutive yearS could indicate a chronic
divergence between fiIember States ' economic situations. The Community
authorities would then make a special examination of the situation
of the State in ~estion and take the appropriate measures
to give effect to Community solidarity in the light of the assessment
the convergence of economic situations and policies.
CONCLUDING RENARKS
As there is no Treaty provision for specific means of action
on which the correcting mechanism thus outlined could be based
, the
Commission considers it would be necessary to have recourse to
Article 235 EEC.
The arrangements suggested by the Comlnission could be operated
for a trial period of seven years. At the end of that time the
Community authorities would consider the conditions of application
of the mechanism and take steps accordingly.
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